James Gengo v. Jets Stadium Development, LLC by unknown
2019 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-29-2019 
James Gengo v. Jets Stadium Development, LLC 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019 
Recommended Citation 
"James Gengo v. Jets Stadium Development, LLC" (2019). 2019 Decisions. 795. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019/795 
This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2019 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 18-3103 
_____________ 
 
JAMES T. GENGO,  
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, 
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
 JETS STADIUM DEVELOPMENT LLC;  
NEW YORK JETS LLC 
 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No. 2:18-cv-08012) 
District Judge:  Hon. Stanley R. Chesler 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 2, 2019 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, HARDIMAN, and SILER, JR,* Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed:  August 29, 2019) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION+ 
____________ 
                                                 
* The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
+ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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SILER, Circuit Judge. 
 James T. Gengo appeals the district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss 
filed by Jets Stadium Development LLC and New York Jets LLC.  The order dismissed 
the remaining two counts of Gengo’s class action complaint.  We will AFFIRM the 
order of the district court. 
I. 
 We write for the parties and relate only the necessary facts.  At issue in this case is 
a personal seat license (“PSL”) agreement between Gengo and defendants.  The 
agreement both allows and obligates Gengo to buy season tickets to football games 
played by the New York Jets in MetLife Stadium.  Gengo paid a fee for the agreement 
because, at the time, it was the only way to purchase season tickets in Section 245a of the 
Stadium.  Defendants now sell season tickets in the Section to purchasers who have not 
entered into a seat licensing agreement (i.e., have not paid the fee).  Gengo argues this 
decision by defendants has rendered his agreement “valueless,” and constitutes a breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the agreement and is a violation 
of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.  The district court found that the complaint filed 
by Gengo did not state a plausible ground for relief under either theory and dismissed the 
action.  See Gengo v. Jets Stadium Dev., LLC, 2018 WL 4144686 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2018).   
II. 
 This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Foglia v. Renal 
Ventures Management, LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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III. 
 Gengo’s claim under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails 
because he has received the fruits of his contract.  See Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. 
v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 864 A.2d 387, 396 (N.J. 2005) (Gengo “must provide 
evidence sufficient to support a conclusion that the party alleged to have acted in bad 
faith has engaged in some conduct that denied the benefit of the bargain originally 
intended by the parties”) (quoting 23 Williston on Contracts § 63:22 (4th ed. 1993 & 
Nov. 2018 update)).  By signing the agreement, Gengo represented that he “acquir[ed] 
this PSL solely for the right to purchase tickets to Jets Home Games played in the 
Stadium.”  The agreement “relate[d] to certain seats in the Stadium,” and gave Gengo 
“the right and the obligation to purchase admission tickets for the Seats . . . .”  Nothing in 
the complaint suggests that Gengo has lost the exclusive right to purchase season tickets 
for these seats, much less that it was defendants’ actions that denied him that right.  That 
defendants might now sell adjacent seats to members of the general public does not 
implicate Gengo’s rights and certainly does not strip him of the benefit for which he 
bargained. 
 In his briefing, Gengo references the “now valueless PSLs” as “unsellable” 
because defendants are currently giving away for free what cost him $8,000.  This 
argument is problematic for two reasons.  First, it is simply incorrect:  there is no 
allegation that the seats for which Gengo contracted are available to the general public.  
Second, this argument at most smacks of a bad deal, not bad faith.  As part of the 
contract, Gengo represented that he was not acquiring the license as an investment and 
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had no expectation of profit; he was acquiring it without a view to resell or distribute it; 
and he acknowledged that defendants did “not represent[] and [did] not guarantee that 
there is or ever will be a market for the resale of this PSL.”  Instead, Gengo agreed that 
he was acquiring the license “solely for the right to purchase tickets” for his selected 
seats. 
 Gengo’s claim under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act fails for similar 
reasons.  He needed to plead an unlawful practice and, regardless of the type of unlawful 
practice alleged, “capacity to mislead is the prime ingredient[.]”  Cox v. Sears Roebuck & 
Co., 647 A.2d 454, 462 (N.J. 1994).  Gengo specifically disclaims that a 
misrepresentation or omission regarding exclusivity or ticket policies forms the basis of 
his NJFCA claim.  But simply changing the terms on which defendants sell other seats in 
the stadium is not misleading:  the plain language of the agreement stated that Gengo 
entered it solely for the right to purchase season tickets for his selected seats and that the 
agreement was limited to this purpose.  The agreement, therefore, belies that a licensee 
could have been misled into thinking it dictated how defendants could sell all other seats 
in his section.  See Fenwick v. Kay Am. Jeep, Inc., 371 A.2d 13, 16 (N.J. 1977) (“The 
capacity to mislead is the prime ingredient of deception or an unconscionable commercial 
practice”).   
 Further, Gengo has not shown ascertainable loss as required by the NJCFA.  It is 
true that ascertainable loss “includes more than a monetary loss and may occur when a 
consumer receives less than what was promised.”  Elias v. Ungar’s Food Products, Inc., 
252 F.R.D. 233, 249 (D.N.J. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  But here, 
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Gengo has made no allegation that he is not receiving what his agreement explicitly states 
is its sole benefit:  the ability to buy season tickets for his seats.  By the plain language of 
the agreement, he has received, and continues to receive, what was promised. 
 We will AFFIRM. 
